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Economic Perspective 2 
THE FORGOTTEN DIMENSIONS OF LOCAL FISCAL REFORM IN SCOTLAND 
by Arthur Midwinter , Department of Politics, University of Strathclyde; 
and Claire Monaghan, Fraser of AT lander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
INTRODUCTION 
The abolition of domestic rates and the 
introduction of the Community Charge are intended 
by the Government to lead to a fairer, more 
accountable, local tax system. All adults (with 
a few exceptions) will contribute to the cost of 
local services, forcing local authorities to be 
more sensitive to the costs of their expenditure 
on local people. Similarly, the electorate 
should more clearly appreciate the link between 
the level of the Community Charge and the spending 
patterns of authorities. 
In the Government's view (1), the new system will 
more properly reflect the use of local services by 
a household and therefore provide a more equitable 
basis for paying for local services. Moreover, 
the new system will be less regressive than rates, 
with Community Charges comprising a smaller 
proportion of household budgets in low income 
families. 
Both these assumptions are highly contestable. 
For example, adults who live in their parent's 
home who at present are not eligible to pay rates, 
will be required to pay the new charge. In the 
case of young adults, their consumption of local 
services is minimal. As regards the more 
progressive nature of the new tax, it is only so 
at low levels of income because of the rebate 
scheme. A recent analysis by the Scottish Local 
Government Information Unit, concluded that 
families, pensioners and single people will all be 
expected to pay the full charge at low income 
levels (2). 
* Dr Midwinter's research is supported by a 
Nuffield Foundation Social Science Fellowship. 
For single pensioners with incomes of £45 per 
week, the tax would consume 3.3% of their income. 
At £60 per week, the figure becomes 6.2%, and at 
£100 per week, 5.8%. At higher levels of 
income, the tax becomes clearly regressive. 
The most dramatic gains are to be found at the 
higher end of the income and housing scale, with 
the extent of gain varying with the current value 
of the property and the size of the household. 
Even private households with three adults can gain 
financially from the changeover (3). 
The Government's analysis of the distributive 
consequences of the Community Charge has 
considerable shortcomings, and ignores important 
dimensions. It is carried out on a national 
scale, and therefore conceals the variations in 
the ratio of winners to losers, that will occur 
throughout the country, both within and between 
local authority areas. Moreover, it is based on 
increasingly unrealistic assumptions about the 
levels of Community Charge, which ignore the 
fiscal dynamics of the new system. The basis of 
the new approach is a simplified grant system 
which accurately assesses local needs, thus 
isolating "marginal spending" above government 
estimates as locally determined, thereby 
increasing accountability. 
In practice, the effect of the reform is to 
increase the interdependence of central and local 
government as central government decisions on 
government grants and non-domestic rating become 
of greater importance in local budget arithmetic. 
In particular, any shortfall between the 
permitted increase in non-domestic rates and 
actual increases in local expenditure will fall 
directly on community charge payers. This will 
be a real problem in periods of rising inflation, 
when non-domestic rates reflect the previous 
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year's inflation levels. This in part explains 
the divergence between the government forecast of 
an average charge of £267 per capita for Scotland 
in the current year, and the actual figure of 
around £300. Such small differences throw into 
question all calculations on winners and losers 
for individuals on rebates. 
THE DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMMUNITY 
CHARGE 
Government predictions of 52% of households losing 
nationally from the reforms, are tenuous, and the 
framework for analysis is limited. However, the 
Green Paper makes clear that local variations will 
depend on the numbers of adults per households, 
the ratio of high to low-rated properties in the 
locality, and the incidence of Community Charge 
rebates. In our research, we have been 
considering issues ignored in the framing of 
national policy, namely the territorial pattern of 
fiscal change and its potential economic 
consequences. Empirical analysis of the actual 
impact awaits the generation of data on charge and 
rebate levels, but we are sufficiently confident 
from our preliminary research to identify certain 
significant trends, whilst acknowledging the 
scale of these trends requires further research 
and measurement. They are produced here for 
illustrative purposes. 
First, there is the shift in tax liabilities from 
urban to rural parts of individual authorities. 
This arises for a number of factors. In rural 
areas, there is a high incidence of properties 
with low rateable values, and a low incidence of 
households in receipt of rebates. In general, 
therefore, the more rural a local authority area, 
the more we would expect to find higher numbers of 
households losing from the changes. Preliminary 
estimates carried out in the Highlands and Islands 
of Scotland suggest that potentially 70 to 80 per 
cent of households could be worse-off, because of 
the high ratios of low to high valued properties 
(including the large number of crofts) and the low 
level of benefit receipts. (4) 
Secondly, there will be a similar shift within 
urban areas between public and owner-occupied 
housing. It is certainly the case that private 
houses tend on average to have higher rateable 
values and hence higher rates, and we would 
therefore expect the occupants of such houses to 
face potentially large gains from the new flat-
rate per capita tax. From our preliminary work 
in the Scottish Highlands, for example, the 
average rates bill in private houses was £475.53, 
compared to £353.40 for local authority houses. 
Our calculations, using the governments predicted 
community charge levels, show an average gain in 
income of £90.00 per year for owner-occupiers in 
Inverness and a 1oss of £2.70 per year for 
tenants. This trend is maintained in the more 
rural areas, although in Caithness, Sutherland and 
Skye and Lochalsh, owner-occupiers also lose from 
the changes. Similar findings have been 
generated by R. Paddison in a study of the 
distributive impact of the Community Charge in 
Glasgow. (5) 
THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The consequences of these illustrative changes are 
two-fold. 
Firstly, in areas where rates reform is forecast 
to lead to income losses for both owner-occupiers 
and tenants, there will through normal multiplier 
processes, be broader effects on the local 
economy. In the research which we carried out, 
having quantified the changes in income which we 
anticipate following the changeover to the 
Community Charge, the Fraser Institute's multi-
sectoral "intra-national" model of the Highland 
Region was used to measure the impact in terms of 
output, income and employment on sectors of the 
economy. The model recognises two types of 
industry: an industry can be classed as "local" if 
consumption within the local boundary is 
approximately met by local production ; and 
"national" industries are defined as those 
industries whose products can be traded across 
local boundaries. There are three sources of 
demand for local industries: demand by final 
consumers; demand by national industries located 
in the local region; and demand from other local 
industries. As might be anticipated, in 
geographic areas where fiscal reform led to income 
losses, local industries were the most severely 
hit. If people are spending less on goods and 
services, then all industries are affected. 
However, in "national" industries, external trade 
is possible and so all the loss caused by a local 
reduction in expenditure, will not necessarily be 
felt since excess produce can be traded. However, 
with "local" industries any reduction in local 
spending is all passed onto the producer. In 
addition since part of a local industry's demand 
comes from other local industries, who are also 
going to have experienced a reduction ir. spending 
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and will consequently have reduced production, 
there will be further multiplied effects. 
Consequently, in areas where the abolition of 
domestic rates and the introduction of the 
Community Charge leads to income losses, there 
will be highly localised economic effects. 
Secondly, we would hypothesise that these changes 
will lead to increased demands for services, in 
both rural and urban areas. In the past, 
households in remote areas have received lower 
levels of public services (albeit at higher costs) 
and despite the general principles underlying 
public service provision in Britain that these 
should be broadly equal throughout the UK, the 
compensation for rural dwellers has been in the 
form of low rates. The impact will be especially 
marked in rural crofting areas where public 
resources have been channelled to counter the 
logic of the market and help retain and invigorate 
traditional communities. In the past, the low 
rateable values of such properties reflected the 
distance from service centres and brought low 
rates. Now, individuals will pay the same as 
there urban counterparts, and no doubt place 
demands for equal services before councils and 
government. 
In urban areas, the pattern of public service 
provision has often tended to reflect the greater 
articulation of middle-class residents (6). Only 
since local government reorganisation have 
sustained attempts been made to tackle the public 
service dimension of urban deprivation, with often 
limited success (7). The shift in tax liability 
from owner-occupiers to tenants will be 
regressive. The assumptions underlying the new 
tax system is that all adults benefit from local 
services, and therefore all, with the exception of 
those on very low incomes, should therefore make 
an equitable contribution to these services. On 
this logic, the case for a redistribution of local 
services and council expenditure towards these 
areas, is somewhat compelling for households 
facing large tax increases. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have argued that the 
Government's analysis of the distributive 
consequences of local fiscal reform has been 
unduly narrow. A wider framework of analysis is 
needed, to examine local variations, and in 
particular we have identified two significant 
shifts, between rural and urban areas, and between 
tenants and owner-occupiers. We have argued that 
such analysis is illustrative rather than 
definitive, and precise measurement of these 
effect awaits further research. 
In summary, the new tax system will result in 
significant shifts in tax burdens,from owner-
occupiers to publicly rented houses, and from 
urban to rural areas. 
It is clear that such dimensions have been ignored 
by government, although some local councils have 
begun to examine these issues. Whilst some 
suitable local policy responses will be possible 
to overcome some of these adverse consequences, 
eg. by targeting resources in favour of remote 
rural areas, tackling the full consequences of the 
changes is beyond the scope of local government, 
and would require manipulation of the financial 
system, for example, in the distribution of 
grants, rebate entitlements etc., or indeed, a 
more sensitive reform of local government finance 
in the future. 
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